




The Politics of Memory in Cazinska Krajina

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THE POLITICS OF MEMORY IN CAZINSKA KRAJINA
CASE STUDY OF “AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF WESTERN BOSNIA”

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Abstract

The research seeks to understand the importance of memory of the armed conflict taking place in Cazinska Krajina (1993-1995), between two ethnically homogenous, but politically and ideologically diverging groups – “mainstream” Bosniaks loyal to the Sarajevo government and Alija Izetbegovic and a smaller group of Bosniaks loyal to the Velika Kladusa government (i.e. Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia) and its rebel leader Fikret Abdic. It is a largely understudied aspect of the Bosnian war, which ended in close to twice the number of deaths of local Bosniaks fighting each other than in the Serb-Muslim armed conflicts in the area.

The primary aim this study is to understand under what conditions political elites can use memory of the recent past in promoting or obstructing consolidation in the local society.

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List of Abbreviations

APWB	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
DNZ	Demokratska Narodna Zajednica (Democratic People's Union)
EU	The European Union
HVO	Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane (Croatian Defense Council)
MP	Member of Parliament
PM	Prime Minister
RBIH	Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
SDA	Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action)
SDP	Socijaldemokratska partija Bosne i Hercegovine (Social Democratic Party)
USC	Una-Sana Canton

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INTRODUCTION

Ever since the end of the tragic Bosnian war in 1995, scholars have been dwelling on a number of consequences of this extremely inhumane conflict. Legacies of political, ideological and religious disputes negatively reflect on the previously peaceful coexistence of the three ethnic communities under one state. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is often used as an exemplary case study of ethnic conflict, often observed as a violent clash between three ethnic groups, the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serbs, and the Bosnian Croats, with significant participation of the respective neighboring kin states of Serbia and Croatia.

Due to the fact that Bosnian society is comprised of different ethnic groups, the perception of the recent past is not equally represented and accessed in the public. The political use and misuse of the memory importantly shapes contemporary social and political life in the country. Duijzings (2007) argues that one of the characteristics of post-war Bosnia is a wide gap in terms of how Muslims, Serbs and Croats perceive the war - underpinned by narratives shaped by historians, journalists and politicians for “utilization” within their own communities. All three ethnicities in Bosnia have not been able to reach agreement on how to remember events, for instance the Srebrenica genocide.

Intuitively, one would assume that memories of war in Bosnia are primarily shaped along the dividing ethnic lines established during the conflict and that the memories of tragic historical events would be somehow collectively shared among the members of the same ethnic group. However, there is an interesting case that stands out from this general pattern of the post-conflict domination of ethnically induced collective memory: it concerns memory and remembering tragic events in Cazinska Krajina, a region in northwestern Bosnia, where two ideologically divided Muslim groups (henceforth Bosniaks) were fighting each other under the umbrella of the larger inter-ethnic conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina was in. It seems that the memory of these events has become a source of self-perception (collective identity) of two Bosniak groups. Today, the region is still overwhelmingly divided – politically, socially and culturally – along ideological lines established during the conflict.

The research seeks to understand the importance of memory in Cazinska Krajina, based on the tragic events 1993-1995, in the relationship between two ethnically homogenous, but politically and ideologically diverging groups – “mainstream” Bosniaks who remained loyal to the Sarajevo government and Alija Izetbegovic and a smaller group of Bosniaks loyal to the Velika Kladusa government (i.e. Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia) and its rebel leader Fikret Abdic. It is a largely understudied aspect of the 1992-95 Bosnian war, which ended in close to twice the number of deaths of local Bosniaks fighting each other than in the Serb-Muslim armed conflicts in the area.

The outline of the paper is as follows:

An overview of the main research questions and arguments, research design and the methodology; in particular it discusses the case selection at the level of political elites and justification for choice of the survey data are presented in the first part of the chapter one. The second part of chapter one reviews the analytical and theoretical frameworks (conceptual apparatus) used. Chapter two introduces the case of Cazinska Krajina and Intra-Muslim political and ideological clash leading to an armed conflict from 29.09.1993 until 07.08.1995, at the peak of the raging war and ethnic cleansing of Muslims by the Serbs and Croats. As Fotini (2008:465) argues, the intra-Muslim war in Bosnia illustrates that, even in situations where the primary cleavage of the conflict is ethnic, the presence of strong local elites and local economic incentives can affect group behavior and undermine group unity. Chapters three aims to pin down and analyze key legacies of the past present in Krajina today. Chapter four analyzes and discusses the attitudes and perceptions of ruling political elites in the region with respect to memory of the past, views on nature and character of the conflict, role of memory in public policy implementation and an outlook on future political consolidation and reconciliation. The paper ends with concluding remarks and suggestions for further study.

1. MAIN QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS

With the intention of avoiding, what Habermas refers to past's 'compulsory reign over the present', a process of conscious 'working through' memory has to be endeavored (Wood, 1999:39). For various different reasons, memory tends to be selective, and this selectivity of memory becomes predominantly apparent in multi-ethnic post-conflict societies. This selectivity of memory produces genuine risks in the context of extended violence. The prevailing view among scholars suggests that ethnicity becomes particularly relevant once state level institutions weaken, inducing individuals to seek security in local group solidarity and hardening. The majority of Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia, for example, have developed entirely different memories of their common past; given the dangers of "too much memory (...) a society must try to attain the right delicate mixture of remembering and forgetting" (Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse 2003:30).

Literature on memory, focused on the social and political dimensions, first emerged in the 1960s. Several authors, focusing on the conflict in Bosnia, do not pay much attention to the notion of memory construction and politics. Works on the memory construction in the particular case of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina are present in smaller quantities (D'Amato, 1994; Kritz and Stuebner, 1998; Gisvold 1998; O'Flaherty and Henkin 1998). An attempt of broader overview of collective memory construction in Bosnia-Herzegovina is presented in "The new Bosnian Mosaic: identities, memory and moral claims in the post war society, by Bougarel, Helms and Duijizings (2007).

None of these works address the region of Cazinska Krajina and the tragic events of Intra-Muslim conflict in the mid 1990s. There is only a modest set of academic papers investigating the character and causes of this conflict, for instance Jasarevic (1997), Demirovic (1999), Ibrahimagic (2000), Klicic (2002), Fotini (2008).

The obvious question arising is in what ways is this case different from cases of local insurgency and intra-ethnic conflicts in other countries? What can we learn from Cazinska Krajina that we cannot learn from other cases; what is not more or less foreseeable?

Cazinska Krajina is particularly relevant for exploring since it is a unique case of violent armed conflict during the Bosnian war which was not ethnically or religiously motivated. The intra-Muslim war in Krajina implies that local elites, driven by different ideologies and interests, can have a destabilizing effect on group behavior.

The degree of regional political polarization generated in postwar period has grown in its importance, hence it is necessary to investigate means of bringing divided groups together and work on the reconciliation process. In addition, the uniqueness of this case rests in the apparent inability of local elites to initiate and reach political consolidation, especially given the wider unconsolidated Bosnian political arena, a country functioning under the international protectorate. Moreover, research on memory of political elites in Cazinska Krajina would be beneficial for making a better assessment of the changing dynamics of the relations between two politically divided groups of one homogenous ethnicity and provide an insight into the socio-cultural context of transitional justice policies in the region.

The underlying assumption is that there are at least two competing memories of the tragic events in Cazinska Krajina during the mid 90s carried by political elites in Cazinska Krajina. For the majority of members of political elites in the regional and state institutions, Mr. Abdić is considered to be a traitor, who organized secessionist Bosniak forces to fight against the people loyal to the Muslim-led Government in Sarajevo, thus undermining the survival, sovereignty, national unity and integrity of Bosniak people in a defense war against two other enemies of the newly independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Followers and supporters of Abdić's ideology faced anger and retaliation by Bosniak government in Sarajevo as a result of two major political decisions of Abdić:

peace pact and cooperation agreements signed with the Serb army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, surrounding Cazinska Krajina AND a unilateral self-proclamation of Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, rejecting the loyalty to the central political leadership in Sarajevo.

On the other hand, a small but still locally powerful group of people, supporters of Abdic's ideology, are inclined to justify his actions under the argument of a diplomatic preemptive reasoning with much stronger and influential enemy in order to avoid the terrible destiny yet to be faced by people of Srebrenica and other regions in Bosnia.

Both of these narratives still strongly divide people in Cazinska Krajina even today, despite the fact that Mr. Abdic was tried and convicted to 15 years in prison for war crimes committed in the region. These divisions have been presently reinforced by Mr. Abdic's early release from prison, after serving 2/3 of his sentence, on March 09th 2012, in the Croatian city of Pula.

My arguments can be outlined as follows:

Initially I will argue that memory of the recent events in Cazinska Krajina 1993-1995, matters to local political elites and remains a salient factor. Subsequently, I will argue that political elites are engaged in politics of long lasting silence on the dividing issues stemming from memory of the past. I attempt to show that, contrary to the politics and culture of silence, memory of the past events is present and highly relevant: legally, institutionally, and culturally. This is one of the core puzzles I explore in this thesis.

The communication and interaction between the two different political elites, divided along the same ideological lines as during the conflict, could only be achieved by mutual recognition, mutual trust, and adjustment of negative attitudes based on memory of the tragic past they shared. I assume that proactive engagement of political elites in dealing with issues of memory might lead to political consolidation, democratization, more effective human rights protection and securitization of the

both political groups and further reinforce reconciliation process within both socially divided communities.

In sum, I hypothesize that the past matters; legacies of the past are still salient and present in the society. However, politics and culture of memory are not observable. There is a domination of silence which produces confusion among members of political elites in shaping their memory and attitudes towards the past.

As stated, my initial assumption was that memory would be alive and it would matter. With this assumption I went to conduct a field research. My aim was to understand how important this memory in institutional reality of the region is. I have anticipated that elites would have conscious attitude about the past. Also, I assumed that they have developed minimum dialogue with former opponents in an armed conflict.

Initially, a widespread lack of readiness to confront the past was observed, which led me to the question: Does this mean that memory does not matter in shaping contemporary politics and societal culture? What I found as an answer to this was that memory of the recent past produces high degree of confusion among political actors. Policy options are open, but reaching compromise through dialog is questionable and dependent on various intervening factors (political motivation, preferences communities, attitudes in the academia etc.) I have inquired in the line of this assumption, and actors have shown a pluralism of opinions and attitudes. Is this a constructive reflection on the past? Is there intent to resolve the issues? Was there an attempt to voice the silence by conscious actions of the actors, a proactive approach to what happened and how it matters? I will try to address these and related issues by exploring and explaining different attitudes of actors towards fundamental questions related to the recent past and its possible implications.

1.1. Main and Supporting Research Questions

I depart from the insight that the line of division between the two Bosniak groups in the region persists until today. My assumption is that this is due to the work of memory and the lack of readiness to address this work. The focal point of the research will be the clash and the management of memory of the past in shaping current attitudes of members of local political elites observed at the micro level (Cazinska Krajina). The overreaching purpose of the thesis is to comprehend the overall role and place of memory in a process of political consolidation and reconciliation in the region. An answer to the following questions is to be explored on the level of political elites:

1. What tragic events from the war years do members of ruling political elite decide to remember?

What are the main factors of their choice? Answering this question assumes the memory works as a matter of political choice, thus is independent from the question of whether apolitical decision to remember/forget is really able of influencing the content of remembrance; or if this ‘politics of memory’ is relevant independently from potential persistence on forgetting.

2. How is this conflict viewed, shared and narrated among local political elites; how are these events remembered and commemorated?

3. Who are the main actors of dominant attitude to memory? While realizing that the focus on political elites is too narrow for reaching any reliable conclusions, I argue that it is important enough to reveal a perhaps crucial part of the memory dynamics in the region. The question of social/cultural memory building in Krajina deserves a much broader fieldwork that is perhaps unrealistic within the confines of an M.A. thesis research; in this regard, my MA research as the first step towards a more comprehensive research.

4. What are the main forms of institutionalization of memory conflict? Why and to what extent do

they burden political and social communication, overall stability and prospects for consolidation/reconciliation?

With the aim of fulfilling the research objectives, various factors are classified into categories of importance to study of memory and its manifestation in the political arena. Levels of importance of are aligned according to priorities member of political elites considers in promoting a common (overall, minimally acceptable) understanding of the past in the political processes. These include an active approach towards remembrance, promotion of common values, education in schools and in the media etc. Memory of the recent past in Cazinska Krajina involves exploring attitudes of political elites in promoting or hindering political communication and reconciliation/consolidation in the region.

Ultimately, the goal of this research is to investigate the origin, character, forms and actors of silence at the level of political elites. Through this analysis I will endeavor to show whether the absence of proactive attitudes to the past is feasible in the context of democratic transition, and whether it is normatively justifiable.

1.2. Research Methods and Design

The focus of this research is twofold. Firstly, it is concerned with the issues of memory politics at the elite levels in the aftermath of intra-Muslim war in Cazinska Krajina. On the other, it endeavors a critical approach and analysis of the character of the present-day state of memory, prevailing silence and the moral and political confusion it creates.

As previously mentioned, conducting research on the impacts of memory of the recent tragic past events in Cazinska Krajina is important for a number of reasons. First, there is a lack of methodically consistent research on this issue in the region. Second, there is an utter need for deeper understanding and more comprehensive addressing of the conditions and questions regarding the problem at hand. Finally, the aim of this research is to scientifically contribute to the topic and give

help to actors of regional political consolidation and reconciliation.

Previous research on the nature and character of the conflict in Krajina has established the severity and complexity of this issue. However, researchers have not comprehensively addressed and accounted for the questions of how is this conflict viewed, shared and narrated among local political elites; why and to what extent it burdens political and social communication, overall stability and prospects for consolidation/reconciliation.

This study seeks not only to shed light on this matter, but it also sets its goal in finding the mechanisms that help explain under what conditions political elites can use memory of recent past in promoting or obstructing consolidation in local society. In addition, this research attempts to bridge the gap between academic and policy fields by introducing perspectives of empirical reality to the existing problems.

As suggested by King, Keohane and Verba (1994), when examining single-case studies, it is necessary to at least make a small number of observations within a “case” and to make comparison among them. The qualitative approach to data gathering and analysis will be used throughout the research, to illustrate the attitudes of political elites in Cazinska Krajina towards the past, implications of conflict 1993-1995 onto today’s politics and for prospects consolidation in the region; the content of narration and representation of these events among themselves and attitudes towards their former ideological opponents during the conflict. The attitudes of elite members are thereafter juxtaposed in the different timeline and party membership. The primary interest rests in observing who is saying what in the interview (with respect to their current and previous political and social position/status). My assumption is that their stance towards the past could explain their current political motives and actions with regard to gaining/loosing electoral support from their constituents. The research is mainly based on study and empirical analysis of primary sources. Furthermore, an assessment of relevant academic and newspaper articles, court rulings, books as well as other applicable documents and published testimonies and on the topic - interpretative

textual analysis – will be part of this research paper to complement and to clarify the obtained attitudes.

1.3. Selection and the Structure of Interviews

Elites are decisive factor in developing the public opinion (Herrera, 1992); a member of the political elite can be defined as a person who won a political mandate in an election to lead and govern and who is in a position to view him/herself in that way (Scruton, 1996).

Fair representation of opinions within this research was intended to be accomplished by focusing on interviewing only members of political parties which have been participating in the Cantonal government after the end of Bosnian war (1995) i.e. those who could initiate and carry out an official memory related policies with regard to conflicts in Cazinska Krajina. The selected respondents had to participate in government' executive or legislative branch as member of their respective parties in on Municipal, Cantonal or Federal level in the period 1995 – present.

Elite interviews are conducted on a relatively small amount of representative cases (7); these are representatives of the main (ethno)national party, holding power in the Una-Sana Canton¹ from 1995-2011, right wing Bosniak SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije) – total five (5), and previously members of the biggest opposition party, but currently their coalition partners and the leading party in the Canton since 2011, Social Democratic Party SDP² - total two (2).

The primary sources were complemented by academic papers, legal acts, court rulings and other relevant documents.

1. The Una-Sana Canton, is one of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is located in the northwest of the country, administratively covering the area of Cazinska Krajina. The center of canton government is in Bihać.

2. DNZ (National Democratic Union) was founded by F. Abdic in 1993. It is a party with a strong regional foothold in the Una-Sana Canton, primarily in the Municipality of Velika Kladusa where it gets most of the votes. At the parliamentary elections (2010) DNZ won one seat both in the entity and the state parliament. Currently, members of this party are in the government opposition. President of DNZ is Rifat Dolic (Banovic and Gavric, 2011).

Members of this party were not included in the analytical part of the research because my intent was to investigate the attitudes of party members who had (at one point in the timeline) assumed power in Canton (1995-present), either alone or within the coalition.

The interviews were conducted in a semi structured manner, all interviews took the form of a conversation, and all questions were open-ended; responses of the interviewees varied in length, time and number of issues tackled. The approach used dealt exclusively with aspects and factors relevant to objectives of the research.

I am completely aware of both advantages and disadvantages of the interview technique used. Semi structured interviews are chosen with aim of avoiding rigid responses to very sensitive and complex issues; giving the respondents space and freedom to engage in much more meaningful deliberation of their answers and tackling predetermined all researched categories was considered to be the best option. However, an application of this procedure resulted in lesser coherence of the obtained data and more difficult and time-consuming analysis.

Given that I am exploring the attitudes of political elites, special attention was paid on who is saying what in the interviews. In order to reduce the degree of arbitrary interpretation of the data, a content analysis method was also used. This is to make "inference by systematically and objectively identifying specific characteristics of message" (Holsti 1969:14).

The underlying assumption was that I will find conflicting views towards past among members of political elites coming from different parties participating in local (Cantonal and Municipal) government over the timeline of 17 years since the end of conflicts in Cazinska Krajina. In addition, I anticipated to find conflicting views among members within each of the two investigated parties, regardless of the party (un)official profilization and stances towards the past events and their legacies.

I have developed a coding system that will help me to operationalise theoretically salient variables of research interest.

Variables	Indicators
Conflict in Cazinska Krajina 1993-1995.	Political elite 'overall negative attitude towards the post war development related to political and societal consolidation; attitude towards another group. Elite attitudes towards dominant narratives of the past. Positive/negative view on influence of political or other factors outside the Canton. Definition of conflict and role of actors in the war. Role of Islamic Community in the war. Role and influence of 'Sarajevo' in shaping attitudes. Role of 'Serbia and Croatia'. View of war crimes.
Political dynamics	Modes and motives of political elites to approach the issue of memory in Cazinska Krajina 93-95
Attitudes on Political (Cultural) Consolidation and Reconciliation	Definition of reconciliation/consolidation Negative /Positive views/attitudes on reconciliation

1.4. Conceptual Apparatus

In order to effectively scrutinize the research objectives presented in the analytical framework, relevant theoretical framework is to be introduced.

Climo and Cattell (2002) relate memory to those cultural perceptions, attitudes, principles and institutions within a community that are passed onto next generations. "Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols. This includes their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional ideas and specifically their attached values; culture systems may also be considered as products of action, as well as conditioning elements of further action" (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952: 357). Memory could also be understood as the "persistence of something from the past into the present" (Halbwachs, 1994 in Berliner 2005:200) or as "past which perseveres because it remains relevant for later cultural formations" (Olick and Robbins, 1998:129).

According to Dosse (1999) "memory" refers to the past experienced, lived and shared by different social agents. Focusing specifically on the issue of collective memory after atrocities, Booth (2001:777) suggests that "Memory reminds us of a duty to keep crimes and their victims from the oblivion of forgetting, of a duty to restore, preserve, and acknowledge the just order of the world. Memory seizes the crime, keeps it among the unforgotten, and insists on retribution. What we remember will determine what we become." Ultimately, the concept of "collective memory is what remains from the past in groups' life, or what groups do with the past" (Nora 1972: 398).

The past is recovered from the present; the process of recovery can have both direct and indirect impact on actions taken in the present. Colmeiro (2011:21) argues that memory is a "present collective consciousness of the past", and it is not the experience itself that creates the traumatic effect, but the recollection of it. LaCapra (1994: 12) points out that there is always a time lapse, a period of "latency" in which forgetting is characteristic, between an incident and the experience of trauma.

Given the observed phenomenon of divided memories and separate commemorations in Cazinska Krajina, it is important to introduce differentiation between ways of commemorating. Ashplant, Dawson and Roper (2000) outline two basic approaches: from above (top down), when elites are controlling the process mainly for different political reasons, and from below, where the focus is on the subjective and psychological needs of individuals. There is a danger that a 'top-down' approach to issues of memory could give the questionable impression that human minds are endlessly manipulable and that schooling or the broadcasting of commemorative ceremonies can fundamentally alter personal memories of strongly emotional, life-changing events such as violent bereavement. This impression may be created partly by a somewhat imprecise use of the word 'memory', since studies in the domain of 'politics of memory' often say a lot about politics but not so much about memory; a monument is not a memory (Confino 1997 in Sorbaji, 2006: 2).

One of the concepts used in the analysis is borrowed from Kalyvas (2008:1044-46), and it relates to so-called notion of ethnic defection. He argues that the distinction between ethnic and nonethnic civil wars is based on a microfoundation that establishes a clear link between identity and behavior. Namely, ethnic boundaries³ are cemented rather than trespassed; Bosnian Muslims do not become Croats (despite the fact that religious conversion is theoretically possible), the same way as Tamils do not turn into Sinhalese, Iraqi Sunni into Shia etc. The argument that ethnic cleavages are deeper or harder than nonethnic ones implies that few people fight for or can be recruited by the opposing ethnic group and those leaders cannot broaden their appeals to include members of rival groups. In contrast, nonethnic (ideological) wars are seen as contests between the government and the rebels for the loyalties of the people (i.e., their hearts and minds); the same population serves as the shared mobilization base for both sides (Kalyvas, 2008: 1046).

Kalyvas (2008:1055) introduces the concept of ethnic defection, which is extremely important even when the numbers of defectors remain relatively small. He argues that in certain cases, ethnic identity ceases to be a reliable indicator of pro-ethnic rebel behavior. Accordingly, ethnic rebels are forced to resort to violence against members of their own ethnic group. Ethnic defection matters, because it destroys precisely those elements that make ethnic identity so important for collective action in the first place. As a result, many ethnic civil wars, namely those where ethnic defection takes place, turn into contests for the loyalty of the population and resemble nonethnic civil wars.⁴

Kalyvas (2008: 1063) outlined two main features of ethnic defection: Firstly, it is largely a process endogenous to war. Once a war begins new, previously unavailable incentives appear, leading

³ According to Hutchinson and Smith (1996:6-7), ethnic groups are said to have a common proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture (e.g., religion or language), a common bond with a homeland, and a sense of solidarity. Many authors agree that these elements of shared culture and history may be perceived or real.

⁴ Such social dynamics can be observed in many recent insurgencies that are classified as ethnic wars, including in Algeria, Kenya, South Lebanon, East Timor, Punjab, Kashmir, Chechnya, and more recently, Iraq. Unlike colonial Algeria or Kenya. In all these places, many members of ethnic groups that supported an insurgency (Lebanese Shiite Muslims, East Timorese, Chechens, Sikhs, Muslim Kashmiris, and Sunni Iraqis) joined forces with their ethnic "enemies," the Israelis, Indonesians, Russians, Indians, and Americans (Kalyvas, 2008: 1054).

people to collaborate with organizations hostile to the ethnic group with whom they are associated. Secondly, ethnic defection can be primarily demand driven: rather than emerging as a spontaneous individual process, it is generated by the organizational demand for collaborators.

Kalyvas (2008: 1052) highlights several factors which might have an influence on ethnic defection: First, dire need for local support converged into a massive recruitment. Second, emphasis of the benefits that followed from siding with what appeared to be the stronger side. Third, the multiple and heterogeneous motivations underlying the choice of those who joined the auxiliary units (Roux, 1991:15). Fourth, local cleavages coercion opportunism and revenge as important factors (Branch, 2007: 3). Fifth, abundant resources and material incentives (better food, free movement, local status etc.). Sixth, overall dislike of colonialism (Anderson, 2005). Seventh, motivation by prosaic and personal concerns; interests of family members; need to protect the property; sense of social status; personal values (Kalyvas, 2008: 1053). Finally, the importance of geographical factors (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Kocher, 2004; Toft, 2003).

Another concept used in the paper, the 'culture of silence', indicates a pattern of values, beliefs and attitudes that gives a distinctive shape to a group's stance and actions towards the past regime, mass crimes committed, and their consequences (Moody-Adams 1997:83-86). The culture of silence relates to the predicament of 'ordinary people', i.e. to their beliefs and attitudes about what happened; their evaluation, whose temporal and formal points of establishment, cannot be identified; they are not legally and politically authoritative (Dimitrijevic, 2009:135).

Lübbe argues that there is a need for 'communicative silence', after society has suffered a trauma. Namely, dealing with the past immediately after the regime change could only result in forcing people to exercise 'political rituals of remorse', which would effectively equal imposition of the political culture of guilt. Another presumption is that "only if we agree to remain silent, will it be possible for us to re-construct the fundamental continuity with our better past and its genuine traditions and values" (Lübbe 1983: 585; 2001:41 in Dimitrijevic, 2009:136).

On the other hand, Dimitrijevic (2009:135) explains that the term 'politics of silence' refers to political actors, and to policies designed and implemented by authoritative decisions, which aim at eliminating debate about the past from the public sphere.

The concept of denial at the organized level (in public life), as outlined by S. Cohen (2001), often emerges as: propaganda, mistrust, disinformation, manipulation, spin, misinformation, fraud. These are standard responses to allegations about atrocities, corruption or public wrongdoing. A different form of conscious denial is the deliberate choice not to expose ourselves to certain unpalatable information. This theoretical concept will be used in the paper to evaluate the attitudes and positions of elite members towards the past.

The question of reconciliation among political elites has been more commonly observed as an essential part of the process of long lasting peace-building. Lederach (2002) proposes that the focus of reconciliation is on restoring and rebuilding of relationships. He focuses on a constructive relationship of the former adversaries as the basis of long-term resolution of conflict, and the need of addressing the cycle of mutual exclusiveness inherent in the past. In that sense, mutual acknowledgment of past experience is seen as a key element in the process.

Huyse (2003: 28) asserts that reconciliation is to be understood as an over-arching process which includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness and healing. Politics is a process to deal with the issues that have divided us in the past. The past has to be addressed in order to reach the future. Reconciliation is the means to do that. Healing, truth-telling and reparation will deliver important short-term benefits but generally they will not eliminate altogether the underlying causes of the past violence. Long-term tools are also required; the three most important ones are education, memory and retrospective apologies.

Hayner (2001:161) argues that "reconciliation implies building or rebuilding relationships today

that are not haunted by the conflicts and hatreds of yesterday". She also suggests some indicators to for establishing reconciliation: 1) how the past is integrated and spoken about between former enemies, 2) if contradictory versions of the past have been reconciled, and 3) if relationships are based on the present or past.

Finally, the conceptual notion of social trust is to be introduced. Offe highlights different areas of trust; by combining the mass/elite and horizontal/vertical dichotomies, we get four realms in which trust relations can unfold: "First, trust of citizens in their fellow citizens or in sub-categories of the universe of "everyone else". Second, the trust of mass constituencies in political or other sectoral elites. Third, the horizontal trust extending among political elites as well as other sectoral elites, such as business, labor, religious, academic, military etc. elites. And fourth, the top-down vertical dimension of trust where elites form beliefs about the behavioral dispositions of sectoral constituencies or entire mass publics." (1999:2).

2. THE INTRA-MUSLIM POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CLASH CONFLICT IN CAZINSKA KRAJINA

2.1 Historical background

The purpose of this chapter is to briefly present the historical background to the ideology, motives laying behind the conflict in Cazinska Krajina and to outline the main figures, actors and events.

The Cazinska Krajina (1,500 km² in size, with overwhelmingly Muslim population of 180,000) is an enclave in northwestern Bosnia. It includes the municipalities of Bihac, Buzim, Cazin and Velika Kladusa. It borders with Croatia in the west and north and is geographically cut off from Sarajevo by areas mainly populated by Serbs on its east and south (please see the Appendix 1, map of Cazinska Krajina during the conflict in 1994).

At the largest public gathering of Bosniaks in Bosnia, on 15.09.1991. Fikret Abdic⁵ officially joined the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), founded by Alija Izetbegovic, with personal commitment to contribute to the development of economy, wealth and overall prosperity of every nation in BiH (Jasarevic, 1997:13). In the upcoming first democratic presidential elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Abdic, also known as Babo (eng. Daddy), received 1,010,618 votes, whereas his party president Alija Izetbegovic has 847,386. Hedges (1996) suggests that Mr. Abdic traded his mandate to the state presidency with Mr. Izetbegovic for the appointment of one of his lieutenants as Interior Minister.

5. A famous Yugoslav businessman who had set up an economic empire – food and agricultural products conglomerate headquartered in municipality of Velika Kladuša called Agrokomerc, with operations extending across the entire area of former Yugoslavia. In April 1987, The National Bank of Sarajevo conducted an investigation, with which they showed the Velika Kladusa-based company had issued more than 17,000 promissory notes to cover its insolvent operations. Fikret Abdic, acting as the company director, had close relations with the Hakija Pozderac deputy in the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia, brother of Hamdija Pozderac who was a member of the SFRY presidency. When the scandal broke, Abdic was expelled from the Central Committee and the Pozderac brothers were dismissed in disgrace. The scandal was the beginning of the end for communist rule in Bosnia, resulting in the breakdown of unity in the Bosnian political establishment and providing a powerful impetus to institutional decay. But even with the local communist elite discredited and in disarray, the system continued to function, albeit with some personnel changes at the top (Ramet, 2005). In late 1987, Agrokomerc was suddenly declared bankrupt, and Abdic arrested for fraud. At the time, the case was seen as an economic shock, revealing the shaky underpinnings of a debt-ridden communist economy (Hedges, 1996) The clandestine economy of the Cazin Area was also at the heart of the later political division between the central government in Sarajevo and Fikret Abdic (Andreas, 2004).

Mr. Abdic's political popularity and reputation stemmed from his highly successful projects in infrastructure, especially in food conglomerate Agrokomerc in Velika Kladusa. During the 30 years of his active role in building Agrokomerc, Abdic became heavily dependent on finance from the Serbian-dominated government in Yugoslav capital of Belgrade (Burns, 1993).

At the outbreak of the Bosnian war (1992) Serb efforts to take over Bihac, the largest city in the Cazinska Krajina, were unsuccessful. The area was constantly under siege by Serb forces, especially after the declaration of Bihac as a UN safe area in April 1993.

The armed forces of The Fifth Corps of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army (henceforth RBiH), settled in Bihac, were under command of General Dudakovic, loyal to Sarajevo and Bosnian-Muslim President Alija Izetbegovic.

Instead of fighting the Serb forces in the region, Mr. Abdic opted for "a non-interventionist network of political and economic alliances with the neighboring Serbs in the occupied areas of Croatia, and also with Croats trading in virtually everything, including food and weapons. His essential assumption was that if people are making money, they will eventually forget about ethnic differences and war" (Cohen, 1994, Fotini, 2008). Mr. Abdic denounced what he called the destructive Muslim nationalist politics of President Alija Izetbegovic (Lane, 1994). In September 1993, in municipality of Velika Kladusa, Abdic declared the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (APWB), due to diverging ideological visions. Soon after the declaration of the APWB, Abdic signed a pact of cooperation and friendship with the Bosnian Serb Republic (October, 1993) and an agreement on political and economic cooperation with the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats in November of 1993.

Subsequently he organized Muslim forces into armed conflict against the Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina loyal to Izetbegovic's government in Sarajevo (Hedges, 1996) This situation led to a position where Cazinska Krajina became politically isolated and its citizens are often said to experience a sense of being betrayed by everyone in Bosnia (Håkansson and Sjöholm,

2007) Inter-Muslim war has also been observed as widening of divisions based on degrees of religious orthodoxy, even within the Bihac community (Graham, 1998).

2.2. The Conflict

Clashes between Serbs and non-Serbs in Bosnia began in August 1991⁶. By October 1992, the Croatian Army was engaging in collaborative behavior with Serbian forces - for example, pulling out of Bosanski Brod in order to allow Serb forces to capture the town (Ramet, 2005).⁷

As mentioned above, Cazinska Krajina⁸ is an area populated almost with 100 percent Muslim people, geographically disconnected from Sarajevo and other Muslim regions. Also it is surrounded primarily by ethnic Serb as well as some Croat areas. Geographic proximity with Croatia often made people from this area turn to Zagreb or Banja Luka rather than Sarajevo as their most proximate urban center. There was only one open corridor that ran north to the Croatian frontier.

During the summer of 1993 there were news of armed conflicts in Cazinska Krajina between Muslim forces loyal to Izetbegovic and Muslim forces loyal to Abdic. It was definitely confirmed when a rebel Muslim group led by Fikret Abdic established a modus vivendi with the Serbs. His subsequent actions were jointly agreed with the Serbian agents⁹.

6. In late 1991, a part of the JNA units from Croatia were dislocated onto the territory of Bosanska (Bosnian) Krajina. In addition, on the eve of the aggression, a large number of "reserve soldiers" and "volunteers" from Serbia and Montenegro were present in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cekic, 2005). At that time, city of Bihac has become one of the so-called "protected zones" –which had a dual function: first, to show the world public that there has been something done "to protect" the Muslim population, and second, to cultivate division of Bosnia into three ethnically based entities: Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian (Ibrahimagic, 2000).

⁷ The regimes in Belgrade and Zagreb, lead by Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, had planned, prepared and organized the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the genocide against Bosniaks. The overarching purpose was destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state and the "final resolution" of the Muslim issue. Apart from the occupation and division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between the two aggressors, the genocide against Bosniaks was an instrument for achieving the main goal of the aggression - the extension of the order to form "Greater Serbia" and "Greater Croatia" (Cekic, 2005). The two leaders agreed that Croatia would get "the territories of the Province (Banovina) and Western Bosnia, Kladusa, and Bihac"⁷ (Ribicic, 2000).

8. Conflict zones in Cazinska Krajina and district of Bihac, inter alia, included: "Grmec" – Bihac; "Golubić" – Knin; "Svodna" - Bosanski Novi and "Ripac" (Cekic, 2005).

9. Evidence that supports this statement can be found report document no. 03/270-1 from 01.07.1995. – written by the 'Spider' of the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina, signed by general Mile Novakovic, residing in Knin and then in Velika Kladuša sent to the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia, Minister Jovica Stanisic (Mulaosmanovic, 2010).

In June 1993¹⁰, Abdic's willingness to cooperate with the Serbs caught the attention of David Owen¹¹, the European Union's peace mediator for Bosnia. At the time, Owen was pushing Izetbegovic to agree to the latest of his plans to chop up Bosnia along ethnic lines. To put pressure on Izetbegovic, Owen began promoting Abdic as a leader of "dissidents" on the Bosnian presidency who were willing to settle the conflict. This was Owen's orchestrated coup, and Abdic, cheerfully played along while aware of this fact. Izetbegovic, fearing that other regional Muslim leaders might follow Abdic's example, engineered the Bosnian parliament's rejection of Owen's plan and moved to isolate Abdic politically (Lane, 1994).

On September 27, 1993, Abdic, 'the undisputed "master" of Krajina', made an attempted secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina, by declaring the so-called Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. Later on, he established a broad "diplomatic" cooperation with both the aggressor sides, Serbian and Croatian (Demirovic, 1999). Additionally, in response to Izetbegovic's policy, Abdic founded DNZ – Democratic People's Union Party, who won over most of the votes from SDA in the area of Velika Kladusa and in the surrounding municipalities. On top of that he had organized a paramilitary formation called National Defence APZB¹² (Demirovic, 1999). Radicalization of relations among the various political parties has grown in subsequent military conflicts. Abdic's actions were interpreted by Izetbegovic and his government as an act of secession (Banovic and Gavric, 2011).

10. From September 1993 on, Bihac was the scene of a bloody fratricidal sideshow to the Serb-Muslim war in the rest of Bosnia. Both sides committed terrible abuses. Abdic, acting less and less like a sugar daddy and more and more like a dictator, opened a prison camp in which hundreds of Muslims suspected of opposing his rule were brutalized. The V Corps, for its part, harassed and mistreated the 1,000 remaining Serbs in Bihac until they begged the U.N. to get them out. Three months ago, the V Corps, now commanded by Gen. Atif Dudakovic, finally took Velika Kladusa, driving 17,000 of Abdic's followers into Serbian Krajina (Lane, 1994).

11. The Vance-Owen plan of March 1993 envisioned the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into ten federal entities and gave Sarajevo special province status. The Owen-Stoltenberg plan, developed after the Vance Owen plan was rejected, envisioned three federal entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Silber and Little, 1997).

12. There were two periods of military development of National Defense of AP WB- In the first period (October 1993-August 1994), it consisted of six brigades, a special unit of a total of about 8,000 soldiers. In addition, the National Defense AP Western Bosnia had artillery and logistic support from the so-called. Republic of Serbian Krajina. In the second period (November 1994 to August 1995) National Defense forces were consisting of 5000-7000 soldiers, including three light brigades, military police battalion, the unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Demirovic, 1999).

On September 29, 1993, after the Bosnian Parliament had finally rejected the Owen-Stoltenberg peace agreement, an uprising led by the local strongman and Bosnian Presidency member Fikret Abdić resulted in bloody fighting with the Bosnian Army in the Cazinska krajina (Bihać area) (Bougarel, 2007). With the help of the surrounding Serbs, he began arming a militia in Velika Kladusa. Graham (1998:206) reports that Abdić's actions made people feel so angry and betrayed that if the Muslims in Bihać had both Abdić and Radovan Karadžić, the former Bosnian Serb leader, against a wall, and only one round in the AK 47, it would be Karadžić who walked free.

Sarajevo government ordered the Fifth Corps of Bosnian Army to crush Abdić's autonomy (Lane, 1994, Boyd, 1995)¹³. By August 1994, the situation around Bihać had changed drastically as a result of a major offensive launched by the Muslims loyal to President Izetbegović (Barutćiski, 1996). The fighting continued until the summer of 1994, and by late August Abdić's forces, along with 30,000 of his civilian supporters, were in full flight from Cazinska Krajina into neighboring Croatia. In August 1995 Muslim and Croat leaders agreed to end the war and allow the return of Abdić's constituents to Velika Kladusa (Fotini, 2008).¹⁴

During almost three years of existence, Abdić organized camps on the territory of APWB where torture was taking place against all those (referred to as "korpusaši", "Alija's fundamentalists" etc) who did not accept his policy making and politics towards the Bosnia and Herzegovina. The camps were organized in Drmeljevo (the largest camp), Plazikur, Nepeke, Rasetina etc, many of whose inmates died from physical abuse at the camp, and some of the consequences of their internment after leaving the camp. Civilians, prisoners (around 2000) were generally used as a labor force or as a human shield. The existence of these camps was known to the international community, including Mr. Mazowiecki, who had interviewed inmates during his visit to BiH (Demirović, 1999).¹⁵

13. By January 1994 most of the area was under the control of the Fifth Corps, whose leadership signed a ceasefire with Muslim forces loyal to Abdić. The ceasefire agreement was short-lived, and Abdić launched a new offensive on February 18, 1994.

14. By the end of the fighting, in November 1995, some 215,000 people had been killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina - among them, roughly 160,000 Muslims, 30,000 Croats, and 25,000 Serbs (Ramet, 2005).

15. More detailed account on work camps created in Cazinska Krajina between 1993-1995 are beyond the purpose of this work.

The extent humanitarian aid was reaching its destination was determined by the so-called rebel Serbs in Croatia, members of the aggressor paramilitary formation, led by Radovan Karadzic and National Defence APZB Fikret Abdic (Hrnjica, 2012).

At the conflict's onset, the Cazinska Krajina area was literally split in two pieces: people from siding with Fikret Abdic, and people siding with the Fifth Corps of the Bosnian Army.

2.3. Abdic's trial and the verdict

The Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in its decision no. 03-139/93, (September 29, 1993), impeached Mr. Abdic from his duty of member of Presidency of R BiH, thus creating conditions for the initiating a criminal procedure against him (Jasarevic, 1997). The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia¹⁶ authorized the arrest of Fikret Abdic on charges of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.

He was arrested in Croatia (June 2001). The 2,200-page indictment against Abdic included crimes of opening detention camps for his Muslim opponents. Abdic stood trial in the Croatian City of Karlovac; he entered a plea of not guilty, and argued that his trial was politically motivated and based on victor's justice. The regional court in Croatian Karlovac sentenced Mr. Abdic to 20 years in jail for war crimes. According to the verdict returned by presiding judge Jerinic-Mucnjak, the court stipulated to the fact that Mr. Abdic (age 63 at the time) was responsible for the deaths of 121 civilians, along with the wounding of 400 civilians during intra-Muslim conflict in Cazinska Krajina (Vukic, 2002). His twenty year sentence was appealed at the Croatian Supreme Court in 2005; it was afterward reduced to fifteen years. He was released from prison on March 09, 2012, after serving 2/3 of his sentence.

For further reference please see works of E. Huskic, S. Jasarevic, H. Biscevic etc.

16. The Hague Tribunal's mandate had previously been undermined in a variety of ways. In 1993, Bosnian Muslim leader Fikret Abdic signed an accord with Serbia that provided that each side in the conflict would prosecute its own war criminals and that each side would regard the conflict as an internal matter, which would preclude the application of international law (Bland, 1994).

3. MAPPING LEGACIES OF THE PAST IN CAZINSKA KRAJINA

This chapter places the current state of affairs in a legal and political perspective and gives a background on legacies of the past impacting the current state of affairs in Cazinska Krajina. The main claim is as follows: the past has not passed; its institutional (legal and political), normative and cultural remnants are present to the extent that demonstrates the failure of the dominant politics of memory, which I will present below as the politics of silence.

3.1. “Double” Legal Standards?

In the following analysis I will use the term “double legal standards” to demonstrate the ambivalent relationship of BH’s justice system towards ex-members of the two military forces in Krajina who are suspected of war crimes.

In the series of so-called “Bihac war crime trials” taking place after the conflict, the accused men were prevailing members of the National Defense Forces of AP Western Bosnia led by Fikret Abdic. Most of whom were tried and convicted by the Cantonal Court Bihac in the period from 1995 until 1999 (two criminal proceedings against A. Sabancevic and S. Dutovic are in progress).¹⁷

According to Grams and Peschke (2006:263), all of the indicted persons complained that the police tortured them during pretrial detention in order to extort a confession. In its decision, covering five applications, the Chamber established that they were handcuffed or tied to radiators and maltreated by several people at once. They were subject to this treatment at the whim of the police for five, seven and approximately 30 days on end. In addition to the maltreatment by the police, the Chamber found that the Federation authorities failed to live up to their positive obligation under Article 3 ECHR to investigate allegations of ill-treatment by officials. Even though the applicants

17. For more details please see appendix 3 – an overview of criminal proceedings against members of National Defense (Army) of Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia by Cantonal Court of Una Sana in Bihac (April 10, 2012).

Sead Huskic and Almir Sabancevic complained before the investigative judge about the maltreatment in custody, nothing was done to investigate these allegations. One of the applicants claimed in his submissions to the Chamber that, in reply to his complaints, the investigative judge merely stated that ‘he was not a doctor’ (Grams and Peschke, 2006:264).

On the other hand, Mr. Suljo Karajic is one among rare members of Army of RBIH to stand trial for crimes committed against members of the National Defense of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. He was found guilty of apprehension and detention of civilians whom he suspected of sympathizing with the AP of Western Bosnia, some of whom were killed, and others subjected to inhumane treatment and torture. The Prosecutors office of BiH opened investigation on 20 other persons who are suspected of committing war crimes during the conflict in Cazinska Krajina against members of National Defence of the AP Western Bosnia, including Fifth Corps lead general Dudakovic (Kovacevic, 2011), but none of them have yet been tried.

One can observe that the elite members in Cazinska Krajina, as well as the majority members within political elites, are experiencing a cultural slippage towards these court proceedings - “They know, but at the same time they don't know.” (as described by Cohen, 2001:137). This implies that people have access to reality, reasonable doubt that members of their own army have committed crimes against people who they identify as traitors, but they choose to ignore it because it is, to say the least, convenient to do so. Namely, Bosniaks of Cazinska Krajina (who did not support Abdic), observe themselves as “double victims”, to both ethnic aggression by two powerful enemies and betrayal by their own coethnics. It is obvious that strong emotions and the inability to cope with grief makes it hard to face the truth of crimes committed by their own group members. Precisely this cultural slippage does not allow people to reasonably differentiate between two phenomena: sense of betrayal they are experiencing and sense of justice they insist on. The sole fact that Abdic’s followers are, to say the least insurgents, does not automatically exclude responsibility of the other side for war crimes committed against them.

3.2. Controversy over Social Rights: Denying Equality before Law?

In this part of the empirical evaluation, I will try to highlight the ambivalent legal norms which foster social isolation and inequality, thus revealing the attitudes of political elite members towards the legacies of the past; inter alia, access to basic socio-economic rights (pensions), right of proper religious burial and right of public memorialization.

Amended Cantonal Law on Rights of Veterans and Disabled Veterans of the Defensive-Liberation War of Bosnia and Herzegovina (no. 01/2009 – February 5. 2009), in paragraph 13 reads:

According to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, members of the so-called National Defense of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia are not considered to be defenders and veterans by this Law. Their and the rights of family members are regulated by Law on Social Protection of Civilian Victims of the War, as well as other Cantonal laws on social protection of civilian victims and families with children ("Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina", No. 36/99, 54/05 and 39/06).

In the Law on rights of demobilized and fallen soldiers¹⁸ of Una-Sana Canton and amending acts (01/09 – from Feb. 05 2009), still in force and in accordance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia, recognized only three legitimate Armies in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Army of RBiH, HVO (Croatian Defense Council) and Army of Republika Srpska. In practice, this legally entails family members to seek official state pensions, while family members of soldiers recruited in the National Defense forces do not enjoy this right.

When addressing these questions, Mr. Mirsad Vojic, former Minister in charge of war veterans and fallen soldiers and rights of their family members, as well as Mr. Semsudin Dedic, and last of

¹⁸ General Secretary of Ministry of Veteran Affairs of US Canton, Mr. Fevzija Karabegovic, states that the official registry of the Ministry contains names of 4565 fallen soldiers in the US Canton; 9593 persons are beneficiaries of their pensions (as opposed to 2576 persons in registered in January 01. 1996); one-member household receives pension in the amount of 352 KM (176 EUR), 4 and more members within a household receive the amount of 533 KM (266 EUR).

Total of 2,260 Muslim fighters died in the intra-Muslim conflict, as compared to approximately 2,300 who died in combat against the Serbs in the same region. Source of information: Association of war widows of Una Sana Canton. (Klicic, 2002)

SDA's PM from 2007-2011, engage in a form of interpretative denial, outlined in Cohen (2001:107) as legalism. Both of them recognize the legitimacy of human rights issues found in above described legal norms, but they hide behind the legal façade, caught between rhetoric and reality; the things will remain as they are until the political climate changes.

The SDP's (left-center wing) current PM of the Canton, Dr. Hamdija Lipovaca in a personal interview (May 03. 2012), criticized these legal norms which promote inequality, arguing that it is the result of the discriminatory policies implemented by SDA, a party whose representatives were governing the canton for nearly 16 years, against the elites from DNZ, who are representing the interests of people loyal to legacies and work of Abdic. He is especially critical of SDA for not doing anything for the children of these people in the postwar period.

As Dr. Lipovaca explains, pensions have been recognized and awarded to family members of all three military groups participating in the war by their respective entity, but not to children or family members of National Defense forces. He hypothetically asks: Why this separation and segregation of family members of National Defense of APWB? An interesting, yet sarcastic, point he made was that Federal and Cantonal government should have at least considered to award those children a half pension, given the fact that until the establishment of National Defense forces under AP Western Bosnia in September 1993, all soldiers from Cazinska Krajina were members of the Army of RBiH jointly fighting against the Serbian aggressor.

These divisions, as Dr. Lipovaca outlines, have an immense impact on the identity and perceptions of children who had grown up in Velika Kladusa (as well as members of the diaspora coming from this region) towards of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a state which does not entirely protect human rights and enforces discriminating legal acts. It is not only about the access to basic social rights, but also a forceful imposing of stigma and shame upon these young people. He implies that this situation should change in order to abide by basic human and civil rights and that equal treatment towards members of all armed forces, regardless of the sides they fought for during the conflict.

The recent past atrocities in Cazinska Krajina show that there is a great deal of conflicting claims about which group is the 'original, genuine or definitive victim', and whether this victimhood could be perceived in different periods in time. Views and attitudes of Dr. Lipovaca could be interpreted as an attempt to overcome this 'denial of the victimhood' (Cohen, 2001:110), which he previously argued was imposed onto family members of the National Defense soldiers by SDA party in the last 16 years.

3.3. Religious Divisions within a Single Religious Community?

Bougarel (2007) asserts that Muslim fallen soldiers in the 1990s were referred to as 'šehidi'¹⁹ (eng: martyrs). The reintroduction of the word 'šehid' into Bosnian political discourse can in fact be dated to the ceremony organized by the SDA in Foča on 25. August 1990, which commemorated the massacres perpetrated by četnici (radical nationalist Serbian paramilitary forces).

Especially after the war, Bosnian religious ulema insisted that there are several categories of šehidi, and that the only ones that can be considered 'first-rank šehidi' are the soldiers who died in battle and whose motivation was purely religious. Those who died defending their family, their honor or their property, as well as all the people who died a violent death in non-combatant roles (for instance hostages and prisoners) are 'second-rank šehidi'. Only those in the first category should be buried in the clothes they wore when they died and without being washed; only they are absolved of all sins and will be fully rewarded in the world beyond. In making this distinction, the Islamic ulema of Bosnia and Herzegovina are also reinforcing hierarchies, between soldiers and civilians, heroes and victims, men and women, that had sometimes blurred in the course of the war (Bougarel 2007, Duijzings, 2007).

¹⁹ Of course, the term šehid is not the only one that gives meaning to the death of Bosnian Army soldiers; In poems, fallen soldiers alike are described as 'knights' (vitezovi) and heroes (junaci), bound to the epic tradition of the Ottoman Empire and Partisan movement. In any case, the figure of the šehid remains by far the most important, since it joins heroic behaviour, religious motivation, and ultimate sacrifice. In official speeches and documents, the most frequent expression is šehidi i poginuli borci (šehidi and fallen soldiers), the second term referring to non-Muslims and non-believers who fought in the Bosnian Army (Omerdic, 1997 cited in Bougarel, 2007).

However, in 1993, the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued a fatwa²⁰ (an official binding decree) stating that the supporters of Fikret Abdic's army are to be considered apostates, traitors to the faith, and religious burial of their bodies is not to be administered by anyone within the Islamic community. Up to this date, no one is even sure whether this fatwa has been revoked or is still in force.

There have been public pleas, demands voiced by associations of demobilized soldiers and policemen from Bihac (in early 2008) addressed to the grand mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dr. Mustafa Cerić regarding the abolishment of this fatwa. Former members of the Army of RBiH, claim that maintaining the fatwa against members of the National Defense of AP Western Bosnia in force, prevents the Bosniak reconciliation in Krajina. Demobilized soldiers sent their warning to religious leaders openly seeking rights for those whom they fought against. This is regarded as a powerful gesture of ethical values and social self-consciousness (Kazaz, 2008). The Grand mufti did not officially react to these public demands. His silence and disregard are not substantively clear.

At the conflict's outset, religion was used as a tool for 'top-down' manipulation; authoritarian leaders strove to impose their own conception of Islam and definition of Muslim national identity upon a largely secular population, which did not go as planned. At the same time, the SDA tried to take over the role previously played by the League of Communists and to turn Islam into the new ideological criterion for the selection of political and military elites (Bougarel, 1999, 2001). Dr. Mujo Demirović, professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Law University of Bihac, once SDP's Minister of education in the entity government, supports the view that religion played a very important element in the national self- recognition and affirmation of Bosniaks in Cazinska Krajina. Religion, though not heavily practiced among Bosniaks, has always been an important factor in

20. A fatwa is a decree rendered by a high religious Muslim official addressing an issue which is not officially regulated by sharia law, but is (in)directly related to it. The Fatwa issued by Islamic Association of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (November 1993) is registered under code 35/93. A full text of fatwa is in the appendix 4 (in Bosnian language).

decisionmaking. In his view, Bosniaks can only function properly under secular Islam; otherwise the whole concept of state and religion would immediately perish.

Dr. Lipovaca (current PM) affirms that the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina has largely lost its reputation in Krajina, as it is perceived as an active player in the recent conflict. The current capacity of the Islamic Community to initiate or participate in the reconciliation process in the region is heavily diminished.

3.4. Political conflicts in Cantonal Political Institutions

Another factor which clearly marks the conflicts and division between the political elites along the lines of memory and narratives of the recent past is “empty chair politics” implemented in the Cantonal Legislative body of Una Sana Canton (1996-1998), when members of Abdic’s DNZ were not able and/or not allowed to come to Bihac and act as legitimate representatives of people from Velika Kladusa. According to Mr. Klicic, representatives of DNZ were not allowed to participate in democratic processes taking place in Una-Sana Canton after the end of the conflict, due to pressures exercised by SDA politicians. He explains that it was simply too early to start with the healing process given the extent of the wounds that have been inflicted by traitorous forces.

According to the majority of interviewees, debates on character, causes and consequences of the armed conflict in Cazinska Krajina are often part of the agenda in the Cantonal Assembly. They all agree that local and entity leaders, as well as the international community, did not deal with the legacies of the past in the Canton very efficiently, which resulted in unsettled confusion as how to proceed forward. None of the interviewees denies the existing rift.

When assessing the success of the communication in the Cantonal government bodies, Dr. Mirsad Veladzic (the first PM of Una Sana Canton) critically observes lack of remorse, guilt and shame on the side of F. Abdic supporters and members of the DNZ party he founded. He asserts that:

They (members of DNZ) still claim that they are right, that they fought for the right cause, that their path was the right one (...) and then there is no way out of this dialogue. When the conflict ended, they immediately became involved in political life in the Canton, even though their political party was, at that time, an extension of F. Abdic's political ideas.

Moreover, notes Dr. Veladzic, that if there was a legal act which would prohibit any promotion or glorification of war criminals such as Mr. Abdic, the situation would be much different. His party colleague, Dedic (last SDA's PM) confirms this view. Mr. Dedic condemns the current state of affairs and claims that there is no respect for moral and legal norms and principles in the Canton.

Regardless of what the court and historians write about Mr. Abdic and his legacy, there are people who support him and still believe that his conviction was politically motivated and they continue to praise his character and work, which is to me, a very questionable thing.

An almost identical criticism was repeated by Mr. Smail Klicic, former high ranking SDA official in the Cantonal Assembly. He pointed out that there have been attempts to put "the records straight", at least during the Assembly meetings, when a small group of MPs, on various occasions, would approach the microphone and start shouting towards representatives of DNZ 'you are traitors, you are aggressors! Three thousand people are dead because of you'. However not much has changed in this respect, not even when the verdict for F. Abdic was pronounced. Mr. Klicic holds the view that

There aren't many people who have the power, and at the same time, willingness to deal with the legacies of the past (...) this has grave consequences stretching out onto new generations of young people who are left out to listen only to the narratives of their parents.

This point re-emerges in an interview with Dr. Demirovic, who additionally observes that members of DNZ, being in the spotlight of political attention, often try to manipulate the public discourse. As he explains, they strive to find a way around the legitimate ways of winning a mandate within legitimate institutions of the Canton, even Entity and the State, by self-declaring themselves Croats.

Dr. Demirovic elaborates that:

In a Canton with almost 98% of Muslim population, being a Croat is an advantage and gives one better chances of winning a mandate. Since we have proportional ethnic representation in the entity parliament (*remark*: Upper Chamber of Entity Parliament – The House of Peoples), it is not hard to conclude that it is much easier to get into the parliament from the Una-Sana Canton as a Croat, rather than a Bosniak. Members of DNZ have used this avenue many times for their political goals. The most prominent example is Mr. Abdic's daughter, Elvira Abdic-Jelenovic, who is both DNZ's member of Cantonal Assembly of Una-Sana and delegate to the Entity House of Peoples as a Croat representative.

Dr. Demirovic critically perceives this politics as a continuation of Abdic's Goebbels-like propaganda to keep the past in the past and prolong the silence and denial of war crimes he has committed.

Obviously, there is an issue diverging perceptions on responsibility and guilt among elite members – both sides claim the right of victimhood, which implies that the other side should ,repent'. This can be understood as an empty, circulating request and without political weight. However, one needs to make a clear distinction with regards to this issue. Namely, members of political elites (non-supporters of Abdic) clearly refer and constrain their victimhood only to the time period of 93-95, while they perceive that the other side refers to their victimhood in the postwar period, as they are often subjects of ostracizing and political attacks. On the other hand, members of ruling political elites often rely on their moral high ground to seek repentance from the other side, due to the legal qualification of victimhood they have been 'awarded' in various court rulings, national and international resolutions condemning Abdic's actions and politics. As outlined by Elster (2005:11), such processes of transitional justice are profoundly formed by the emotions of the individuals concerned, "be they wrongdoers, beneficiaries of wrongdoings, victims, resisters, accusers, or neutrals. These emotions occur in direct confrontation among the individuals concerned, and tend to fade as the memories fade".

3.5. Public Memorials Only for Members of “Legitimate Army Forces”?

As explained above, the Dayton peace accords recognized only three legitimate Armies in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Army of BiH, HVO (Croatian Defense Council) and Army of Republika Srpska. Acting on this legal qualification in the Constitution, postwar SDA Cantonal government has implemented a policy of building unique, common memorial sites in all 8 USC municipalities along with single person gravestones called “nišan”, for all those soldiers (including ‘sehidi’) who died defending the country, honor and family. In this respect, only members of legitimate armed forces, recognized by the Dayton agreement, were included in this policy, while members of National Defense Forces APWB were left out from being officially commemorated in both public and private memorial sites.

In this spirit, Mr. Vojic explains that the Ministry of War Veterans was in charge of building a common memorial center in each of 8 municipalities in USC and in installing a Muslim gravestones - “nišan” on the graves of every fallen soldier (šehid); family members of non Muslim soldiers who had died fighting in either the Army of RBIH or Croatian Council of Defense, were given the option to get financial compensation to the amount of 750 BAM (350 EUR) to build their own gravestones for their lost family members or a non Muslim designed stone will be placed on their graves by the Ministry worth the same amount of money as for the ones installed on the graves of Muslim soldiers. As mentioned, members of the National Defense Forces were not included in the implementation of this policy. In addition to being denied access to money from the Ministry to build private gravestones, Mr. Vojic reports that their names were also not included in public memorial sites for fallen soldiers of Velika Kladusa built in the harem of Kladusa’s central mosque. The memorial stone contains only names of the soldiers who had fought in the Army of RBIH and not the National Defense of AP Western Bosnia (please see Appendix 2). Dr. Mirsad Veladzic (first PM) confirms this information.

Even if there might have been some publically voiced initiatives to establish a memorial sites for soldiers of the National Defense, Mr. Vojic explains that it would not go through the Ministry nor would it be in their concern to deal with this matter, since fallen soldiers of this „paramilitary formation“, as he referred to them, and are not legitimate and recognized by law. Hence, the officials in the Ministry are not able to act on these initiatives.

Ministry is dealing exclusively executing the law – that is if and until the legislature introduces something else (...) Members of DNZ party still insist that members of National Defense should be recognized as legitimate military unit by legislature in the entity parliament, by trying to qualify them as ‘deserving soldiers’ who fought for this country.

The mode of how Mr. Vojic perceives these issues is another example of Cohen’s interpretive denial – legalism (2001:107); hiding behind legal norms, the observer disputes the cognitive meaning given to an event and re-allocates it to another class of event (from realm of law to realm of politics). In addition to this, Mr. Vojic does not say that these people do not deserve the acknowledgement, but he also does not assume responsibility for initiation of implementing these actions. He prefers to leave this matter to “their people”; thought, at this point, it is hard to predict what kind of reactions memorial site to fallen soldiers of the National Defense Forces would evoke among people.

While conducting interviews, I observed that the resounding majority of members of local political elites believe that all victims of the armed conflicts should have one-single memorial site in each of 8 municipalities of Una-Sana Canton; more precisely, the majority agrees that there should be no different memorial sites for victims of different ideologies – from perspective of Bosniak victims, there should be no difference in commemorating those who were either killed by Serbian enemy and those who died fighting the Abdic’s supporters. One would assume that sharing an agreement on building common memorial site for all victims of the tragic conflicts indicates readiness to overcome differences. However, these issues are viewed exclusively from the perspective of “their

own (Bosniak) victims”; they do not express clear views on how issues of commemorialization of victims of opposing sides should be dealt with. In addition, from what I observed, it is my belief that most members of local political elites I have interviewed would not have strong moral objections to, let us say, the Serbian side building their own memorial sites for their own soldiers somewhere in the Canton, but they would be reluctant to express their full consent to building a memorial site dedicated to soldiers of National Defense and Abdic’s ideology. This attitude maybe best explains why there isn’t any memorial site for soldiers of National Defense Forces built somewhere in the Canton so far.

4. MAPPING CONFUSION: PREVAILING SILENCE, DENIAL AND ETHNIC DEFECTION

Having mapped and explained prevailing social and political legacies of the past in Cazinska Krajina, in this chapter I will compare the presence of these legacies and perception/attitudes of ruling political elites. I will demonstrate confusion of political elites in perceiving the character of war legacies and their perceptions/attitudes towards the conflict and their former ideological opponents, through, mainly S. Cohen's (2001) typology of denial and some of factors influencing the process of ethnic defection described by Kalyvas (2008) perceived by interviewees.

Before I commence the analysis, it is noteworthy to point out that the majority of interviewees I have talked to, though they were direct witnesses of the conflict, some even active participants, did not have sharp and precise, I dare to say fact-based knowledge, on events taking place in Cazinska Krajina 1993-1995. I observed that most of their answers were mixture of culturally shared memory of the past events in Krajina and their personal insights and observations. Almost none of interviewed elite members has expressed a deep, profound and objective factual knowledge on the issues at matter; they all cover "the basics", they know of conflict sites, major actors and key dispute lines, but most of them engage in subjective interpretations of facts and data and have different perceptions of causes, character and consequences of the conflict. In theoretical foundations, this might coincide with Cohen's (2001:101) conception of denial at the organized level; knowledge of elite members is "incomplete, uneven and unobjective".

4.1. Memory Compartmentalized: Controversy over Breaking the Cult of Abdic

My historical analysis, as explicated in the previous chapters, my discussion with members of political elites, as well as talks I had with various people in Velika Kladusa, have led me to assume that people of Cazinska Krajina divide their memories, in either two or respectively three periods.

It is my own observation that Abdic's supporters typically divide the past in two periods: before and after the war, i.e. period of Abdic's rule and period after his imprisonment. This implies that people, (un)consciously, link the memory of good times of Agrokomerc and flourishing economic era together with armed conflict in Cazinska Krajina into one single "happy time unit", while the period following Abdic's imprisonment is considered as the end of this era and the beginning of dark, unfavorable and discriminating times they hope will end with his release.

The nostalgia that is perceived by members of the ruling elites among Abdic's supporters group is a symptom of historical emotion. As explained by Boym (2005:8), a sense of nostalgia is not "antimodern" and it appears to be a longing for the realities of the future and the anticipation of a better tomorrow (for instance, better time to come after Abdic's release). The observed perception of nostalgia also fits into Boym's description of *prospectivness*, where fantasies of the past, determined by the needs of the present, have a direct impact on the realities of the future.

The majority of people in the Canton, on the other hand, divide their memories of the past into at least three different time periods. First, a stable and indisputably peaceful time before the war; a time of armed conflicts, death, fight for survival and freedom (1992-1995); and finally, a period of ambivalent (mostly negatively perceived) democratic and economic transition.

A strong majority of the interviewees have expressed the view that Fikret Abdic and his political heritage is strongly influencing the present political and social life in the Canton. Obviously, his ties to Agrokomerc, a company with 13500 employees who provided for additional 30 000 people, make him a very influential man even when his active participation in political and social life is no longer present.

Dr. Veladzic (first PM) reasons that "Abdic's great potential for "social salvation" is greatly misperceived by many people in Cazinska Krajina.

Abdic is an old man (72). He is a war criminal who spent more than 10 years in prison, a retiree who has absolutely no chance of influencing present political and social change in the Canton, given the new economic and political order. This is capitalism, not communism. Abdic is trying to spread misconceptions of his role in the reconstruction of postwar society in Cazinska Krajina, but he is more used to making mistakes and producing confusion rather than solving problems.

Dr. Demirovic echoes this view.

Abdic is in no way a factor of reconciliation in Cazinska Krajina. His reappearance is a very troublesome factor (...) He is no economic genius, as any perceive him to be. His success in Yugoslavia would not exist if there was no political endorsement of Hakiija Pozderac and other high ranking politicians of Yugoslavian Presidency, and of course politically stimulated high consumption demand of Yugoslav National Army. Moreover, Abdic built his reputation on the development in Agrokomerc to the detriment of people from the Krupa, Cazin, and Petrovac, which many people do not know.

On March 9, 2012 media reports announced Fikret Abdic's release from prison in Pula, after serving two thirds of his 15-year-long sentence for war crimes. He was welcomed by more than 3000 of his supporters, arriving in 40 busses and a number of cars. While his supporters freely expressed profound joy about his release, former members of Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina's were displeased by the news. As reported by media, they will not allow him to "once again start undermining Bosnia and Herzegovina" (TANJUG, 2012). Even though there were no official reports on protest gathering organized in the US Canton, police forces were in stand by position. Dr. Veladzic confirmed that there were no immediate public reactions in the cities, neither from family members of soldiers who had fallen fighting against Abdic's forces. Only high ranking politicians engaged in giving statements, including Cantonal Minister of Internatl Affairs and PM minister Dr. Lipovaca.

4.2. Elite attitudes: continuity of mistrust?

Applying Offe's concept of trust (1999:14) we can see that ruling political elites in Cazinska Krajina lack the capacity to establish a horizontal trust; among political elites as well as other sectoral elites, for instance religious and academic. Solving problems posed by ambiguity and non-communication would require the actors to shape and assess beliefs about each other, in order to establish relations of a reasonably long lasting nature.

Dr. Veladzic (SDA), first PM of US, utters that even though the crimes of AP Western Bosnia leadership and verdict pronounced to Fikret Abdic have been addressed, none of the political actors have managed to establish a clear moral message to politicians coming from DNZ about the nature of the events taking place in Cazinska Krajina 1993-95.

Debates get heated, but nothing really changes, they (DNZ) deny everything. Supporters of Fikret Abdic showed that they have no identity the moment they decided to side with the aggressor. There is no valid argument that could justify this treason. There is no valid reason for someone to take the guns and start shooting at his own people in the middle of violent war.

At this point one could ask, if there is a continuity of mutual distrust present in the Canton? The alleged continuity of mistrust of SDA officials who had assumed power in the last 16 years towards members of DNZ and people of Velika Kladusa is denied by Mr. Dedic, last SDA's PM (2007-2011). He claims that there never was such a policy of mistrust to be inherited by him, nor was there any passive imposition of attitudes by his higher ranking party associates. He admits that there have been officials holding high positions in the Cantonal SDA division, whose decisions were deeply influenced by divisions made during the conflict. However, Mr. Dedic affirms that he personally had no problems working and cooperating with political representatives coming from DNZ, mainly because he was, as legalist, duty bound to perform his institutional role of PM:

I was not held back with the past. I have always tried to have a decent relationship with everyone, even with them (DNZ). They often responded to my approach with their comments or support towards passing some legislative acts in the Assembly.

Dr. Lipovaca (current PM from SDP), who did not directly participated in the conflicts 1993-1995, identifies two reasons why members of DNZ benefit from maintaining perceived mistrust among political elites of the ruling party; and that is the manipulation of their constituents, Abdic's supporters. Firstly, they engage in building a myth of Agrokomec's 'rebooting', and secondly, they control people by suggesting that Abdic is an inevitable factor in this process. Given the current relationship within governing coalition in the US Canton, Dr. Lipovaca explains that

My relationship with Velika Kladusa, with DNZ representatives and the people who did not defile themselves by committing crimes during the conflict is very transparent. But I admit that every trip I take to Velika Kladusa shakes my internal coalition relations with SDA party²¹, because their members are very much troubled with the past.

This implies that perceptions of 'continuity of mistrust' in the Canton are still present among elite members. It appears that perceptions, and attitudes of local elites influenced by them, are taking more moderate forms, however, memory based insights still remain party based and divided according to party's active/passive role in the conflict itself.

4.3. A Future Together over Specific Party Interests?

In this part of the paper, I will try to highlight and compare how, and to what extent, (conflicting) party interests influence attitudes of elite members with regard to remembering, interpreting and narrating the past events in Cazinska Krajina (93-95).

Mr. Klicic argues that there was no significant improvement in relations between political elites in the Canton, especially given that the winning party SDA had an overwhelming majority in the

²¹ SDP, SDA and Party Radom za Boljitak are coalition partners in current Una-Sana government.

government. There was a latent danger of collapse of democracy within the parties and SDA did not care about establishing healthy atmosphere in unstable political arena. According to Mr. Klicic, these strong autocratic powers are still present in the region, and many people are simply afraid, at cost of suspending democratic processes and possibly losing their jobs, to get involved in resolving the issues with their past legacies. Huyse (2003:29) explains that many post-conflict countries at times choose to disregard the past completely. He notes that “this may arise from a desire not to reopen wounds for fear of endangering a fragile peace”.

Mr. Klicic advocates the position that academia should have taken a firm and objective stance on issues stemming from the past, which did not happen. There were some sporadic attempts, yet they did not contribute much.

We have a university in Bihac; they should have had ongoing debates among local and state intellectuals. However, intellectuals are passive in dealing with serious social issues, not just in Cazinska Krajina but in whole of BH. They are silent, so things remain unsettled. There are concealed interests residing in maintaining this silence and these can be justified by fear for their job.

Dr. Lipovaca (current PM), also an assistant professor at Law Faculty of University of Bihac supports this view, while Dr. Demirovic, former Rector of the University of Bihac and two time dean of Faculty of Law, ascribes academia's insufficient involvement to clientelist interests of certain people, but also to lack of minimal critical mass that could break the silence and allow the truth to come out. Additionally, he believes that that things get worse when incompetent people engage in “dulling the truth” with their quasi-scientific observations.

For instance, Mr. Klicic wrote his M.A. thesis (2002) on the legal character of the conflict in Cazinska Krajina, which he titled ‘the intra-Bosniak conflict’. He basically replaced the accurate characterization of intra- Muslim conflict with this incorrect categorization. His work produced confusion. His conclusions indicate that there was some sort of dispute in Cazinska Krajina between these two groups, due to some kind of unresolved argument, instead of a clear-cut case of betrayal on their side. This was not a civil war, this was evidently not an intra-Bosniak conflict, not even an intra-muslim, this was a typical betrayal.

Both by Dr. Demirovic and Mr. Klicic, breaking the silence would require strong forces, strong individuals, socially relevant actors who could mobilize and engage masses to openly approach to a dialogue on the issues related with the legacies of the past. The observed reluctance of political elites to engage in facing the past is to be justified by prevailing economic relations, fear, shame, and even hurt of betrayal.

There is no critical mass, because it requires combating the public interests, which are often circumvented by petty political and economical interests of powerful politicians. No one can even openly condemn the regime, because this would damage political relations. As I said, there is a wide spread political clientelism in the ranks of SDA, SDP (...) There are no intellectual forces in the Krajina. If you cannot create a critical mass, we will not be able to come to trust or to reconciliation. (Demirovic)

Mr. Dedic is in support of this view and asserts that Bosnian Muslims have no minimum policy, no minimum denominator on the character of the conflict taking place in Cazinska Krajina.

4.4. The Role of Societal Culture in Shaping Attitudes of Political Elites

Mr. Klicic emphasizes that instrumentalization of memory in Cazinska Krajina truly exists at the level of political elites, and that it heavily influences public sphere and ordinary people. Memory of the recent tragic history in the region is suppressed by both sides, allegedly due to higher political and economic gains.

Dr. Demirovic remains faithful to his position that one of the major predicaments societal culture of Cazinska Krajina is the geographic disconnection from central government in Sarajevo, which matches with one factors influencing the insurgency and sustaining the ethnic defection process described by Kalyvas (2008). In his view, the Fifth Corps of Army BH had to make decisions that were sometimes not in coherence with desired goals Sarajevo was aiming to push, which on occasion resulted in Krajina being put into oblivion. This is one of strong factor why political elites have negative perception of outside influences onto their politics and way they handle their local

problems.

Another factor influencing attitudes at elite levels is public opinion/support. When asked whether he would ever consider forming a coalition with the DNZ party, all differences aside, Mr. Dedic again resorts to *legalism* (Cohen, 2001:107) and replies that party headquarters set the coalition policies, and that he has little to do with this decision. Moreover, he underlines that party presidency in Sarajevo decides with whom to form a coalition, so in the end these coalitions' calculations are left to people who have no perspective on current issues in local politics.

Obviously, when making these decisions, central party bodies in Sarajevo ask for an advice from local high ranking officials in Cantonal and Municipal party organizations, but decision is left entirely to them.

His personal view is that any potential attempt in initiating coalition talks with the DNZ either on side of SDA or SDP would result in tremendous loss of citizen's support, which no one is willing to gamble with.

Mr. Saracevic argues that attitudes of local elites are also shaped by a confusing interplay of different interests and motives, which are rooted not always in material incentives, but also in mentality of people from Cazinska Krajina. It is a matter of 'ambivalent identities', where people are illiterate, the majority are neither willing nor able to perceive things differently than the way they are served.

We are not accustomed to have our own state, and this is a great calamity. We are not able of imposing any truth. Our identity is very narrow and we do not know where we belong.

His opinion concurs with Roux's view of multiple and heterogeneous motivations underlying the choice of people in joining the auxiliary units (1991:15).

Another important factor in shaping elite's memory and attitudes towards the past is rooted in the relatively short time distance actors are finding themselves in, in order to be able to effectively deal

with the past and its legacies. Memory of recent tragic events in Cazinska Krajina is still fresh and collides with present day issues. Almost half of respondents, from various political backgrounds argue that even 50 years is a small period of time to effectively and objectively reflect on the past, let alone to correct the past mistakes. Dr. Demirovic argues that silence which has been installed in Cazinska Krajina after the conflict is one of those historical errors that could not be made right, not within our generation. These observations can easily be connected with Lübbes' notion of 'communicative silence' (1983:585), and exercise of 'political rituals of remorse' (2001:41), which would effectively equal imposition of the political culture of guilt. In my own understanding, rational reflections on the past atrocities, from a relatively short distance in time, do not work as best tool for overcoming the remaining issues. The presence of strong (dividing) narratives and uneven societal memories undermines the potential to reasonably approach and face the inherited legacies of the past and their consequences.

However, as Dr. Lipovaca observes, the imposition of guilt in Krajina was never an option and was also never an alternative, unless one wants to evoke another social revolt. In addition he believes that the greatest problem of Krajina people is that they easily forget things.

We remember only for a very brief period of time. Moreover, we are ashamed of our past, and it is hard for us to admit the impacts it has on our current state of affairs.

Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse (2003:29-30) argue that in line with Dr. Lipovaca's view. Amnesia is the enemy of reconciliation because: It refuses victims the public acknowledgment of their pain; it invites offenders to take the path of denial; it deprives future generations of the opportunity to understand and learn from the past and to participate in the building of a lasting reconciliation.

An additional factor influencing attitudes of political elites from standpoint of memory on recent past is a widespread sense of betrayal. Ruling elites in Krajina observe AP Western Bosnia as joint

Quisling creation of a condominium, both Croatian and Yugoslav, and their common ground of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosniak group unity (Ibrahimagic, 2000)²².

Mr. Saracevic, a former high ranking military officer (SDA), underlines that the Army of R. Bosnia-Herzegovina is the only military formation responsible for protection and preservation of the constitutional and legal sovereignty of BIH. Members of National Defense of AP Western Bosnia, to him are traitors, deserters, paramilitary formations.

Mr. Klicic argues in the same line:

If people in Velika Kladusa accept that they betrayed us and Bosnia and Herzegovina, we will resolve the problem. We will respond with: 'gentlemen you are traitors, we forgive you but we will not forget'. Any other way would not work. We have to learn from our communist experience, when suppressing memories backfired into our faces.

Dr. Veladzic repeats this argument and adds that the one thing he has personally been missing from Abdic's supporters and politicians coming from DNZ is sense of remorse, a simple statement like 'I repent, I have been mistaken, I was misled'. He believes that continued worshiping Fikret Abdic and his legacies is simply a tragedy of his supporters.

The most heartbreaking fact I see is that Serbs in Belgrade, and even Croats in Zagreb can find it in their minds and apologize to all the innocent victims in Bosnian war, but Abdic's supporters have not been able to do this. It would be a common sense for them to do that, but it still did not happen.

Dr. Veladzic's observations can be theoretically interpreted as lack of admission (with reference to Cohen, 2001:132); perpetrators did not experience a sense of 'unthinkability'; Cohen argues that some pasts have been so atrocious, and the lies so blatant, that even if admission is accompanied by acceptance of responsibility and expression of remorse, this may be (and is often interpreted as) a

²² Decree law adopted by newly established Presidency of Parliament so. AP Western Bosnia aimed to delegitimize legal authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the territory of AP of Western Bosnia (Official gazette of RBiH, no. 12/92" and official Journal of the AP of Western Bosnia, No. 2, December 1993, 02-1-12/93 in Velika Kladusa.

tactical ploy to get a lighter sentence. He explains that is more likely in settings like the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where public truth telling ('full disclosure') and the expression of remorse help to gain indemnity from prosecution, which is obviously not the case in Cazinska Krajina.

4.5. Finding Meaning in Silence

Perhaps, the important factor that strongly shapes attitudes of members of political elites and creates confusing incoherence in their memory reflections on the past is silence. Mr. Klicic, refers to silence as a final stage of social apathy. He repeatedly stresses that there is no critical mass of free thinkers in the region who would be the spiritus of social change. He even goes as far to say that there are no political elites in the region, since he perceives only people who are assuming public power, but working in their own private interests. To Mr. Dedic, on the other hand, silence seems to be easy to overcome a certain thing, but it does not solve the problem. It only prolongs the social indifference.

Dr. Veladzic points toward the fact that although political forces in Cazinska Krajina are fragmented, it is necessary to keep a watchful eye on DNZ and Abdic's supporters. The ruling elites did not pay attention, for instance to proactive comemorialization of victims of the conflict, but they rather turned to silence as a method of dealing with the past. Dr. Veladzic believes that this behavior best protects elite's interests and maintains power balance in the Canton.

Dr. Demirovic (former SDP member, currently a university professor at University of Bihac), on the other hand, is critical of unfavorable impulses coming from Sarajevo, with an attempt to minimize and mitigate post conflict political mistrust established in Una-Sana Canton. He observes that politicians in the Canton have often neglected and even undermined voices coming from the outside, assuming these are out of touch with the local reality. In that way, they would legitimize their local decisions.

This situation produces passive and incoherent relations of local elites towards each other and towards the past, where only the silence prevails.

Dr. Demirovic classifies silence as the first stage towards oblivion, and oblivion as pre-stage of denial of the crime. All three components are parts of instrumentalized strategy of reconciliation based on lies imposed in Krajina after the conflict. He strongly argues that reconciliation cannot be based on a lie, because 3000 people are dead. That is the sole fact. For him, silence is a pathway to denial, and that reconciliation in Cazinska Krajina on the premises of silence, 'the unjustified silence', as he refers to it, is impossible.

WE WILL NEVER RECONCILE (!) Not until we clear the lies. Bosniak reconciliation exclusively depends on Abdic being accepted as a traitor and a war criminal by everyone.

In his doctoral dissertation, he argues that Muslims, should never allow, after having suffered and survived through a genocide, to become victims of memorycide. Political elites should take all necessary measures to establish the truth, because failure to do so would result in grave costs. Forgiving the crime and its impunity allows the latent possibility of its repetition. It is government's and academia's task to put greater effort in studying and presenting the truth, as well as educating the young generations (Demirovic, 1999:267).

The presented views on silence show, as Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse (2003:29-30) argue that years of silence alternate with periods of unrest and deep emotion. As identified above, ruling political elites of US Canton perceive the community of Abdic's supporters to be in a form of cultural denial (as outlined in Cohen 2001:94); those people engage in forms of role distancing, believe information they know is false or fake, and their allegiance to meaningless myths, stories and celebrations of convicted war criminal such as Mr. Abdic. They do not engaging in a process of repentance soul seeking for shame or guilt. One important point to be drawn from this is Dr. Demirovic's warning to 'mainstream Bosniaks' to be careful in how they perceive the past and how

they handle the silence, because there is a potential threat that maintaining silence over long period of time may result in whole society slipping into collective modes of denial potentially imposed by smaller societal groups in denial (such as community of Abdic's followers).

As demonstrated above, 'the fact of silence' is present in the region. However, elite members have different readings, applications and approaches towards this fact. The pluralism of interpretation shows that the memory of the recent past is alive and that it matters; the presence of silence does not indicate that the past ceases to be relevant, quite the opposite, silence has become a feature of the memory.

4.6. Elite's Views and Attitudes towards Bridging the Void

People I have interviewed report several attempts to bridge divisions established by conflicts in Cazinska Krajina. Memory of those tragic events is deeply troubling the ruling political elites, primary divided along the two lines according their roles in the war of Bosnian independence 92/95. All of the interviewees fully understand the importance and limitations of criminal trials that have been taking place in Krajina right after the end of conflict, but they voice a concern that these trials did not trigger further steps towards social and political consolidation.

Klicic: 'Open dialogue'

Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse (2003:29-30) argue that memory is a two-edged sword. It can play a crucial role in making reconciliation sustainable, but it also has the capacity to hinder reconciliation processes. Memory is often selective and, worse, it can be manipulated and abused. However, Mr. Klicic argues that this premise does not hold in case of Cazinska Krajina; he advocates the view political and social consolidation in the region requires a long period of negotiating, openly confronting arguments mastering historical facts. He insists that "Past must be remembered, the memory of it will remain if we openly talk about it. We must openly confront arguments. It would be wrong to forget, forget it not an option. We write the history".

As mentioned earlier, he deems that strong autocratic forces are present at large in the Canton and that they have an interest in maintaining the situation as it is. But, he is also very aware that, at this moment, no one in Krajina is ready to embark into this adventure. This reluctance to dwell on with these issues is justified by political popularity being at stake. This is the price no one is willing to pay.

Dr. Lipovaca: Local Truth Commissions

Truth commissions are seen as an important middle-level approach to reconciliation (Lederach 2002). They assist and evoke a successful reaction to truth-seeking by formerly conflicting parties. Establishing the truth about the recent past, informing and motivating public debate and consolidation of democratic transition, are shown among the potential benefits of truth commissions (Freeman 2005).

Dr. Lipovaca believes that establishing a local TC is inevitable; it would bring a strong impulse of change in the society. He implies that “the best way is the truth commission modeled on South African case, but for that to happen, there has to be a willingness to move towards a true reconciliation”, though he does not draw any precise parallels between.

The only concern he addresses is that there is no social agent who could both/either initiate or implement an objective institutional standards for achieving goals of TC's. These commissions should be independent and neutral, and their findings should be established solely on facts, and not on manipulations. For instance, the capacity of Islamic religious community to be part of this project is impaired by their open siding with one ideological group of Bosniaks during the conflict and the infamous fatwa of 1993.

Dr. Veladzic: It is NOT too late

Dr. Veladzic openly covets for public expressions of repent and remorse from the other side. It is his deep conviction that it is not too late for apologies. Huyse (2003:31) argue that in order for a delayed apology to be relevant and valid, certain conditions must be met: The sincerity of the gesture must be clearly demonstrated; there must be full and unqualified acceptance of responsibility; any justification of the original action (or inaction in the case of bystanders) must be avoided; if the events of the past still produce grief or inequalities, those who apologize in the name of their ancestors must express a clear commitment to change.

In addition, Dr. Veladzic insinuates that all necessary forms of public commemoration, as all forms of memories must be publically available so that the awareness of the past mistakes does not fade away with time and so that people can preserve those common values. He reasons that “all necessary forms of commemoration, public events need to be intact part of our consciousness”.

Contrary to Dr. Lipovaca’s opinion, Dr. Veladzic believes that the Islamic community is just the right institution that could move motives for reconciliation and consolidation in the region in the right direction.

Dr. Demirovic: Missed opportunities, unwelcome memories

Dr. Demirovic, while demonstrating his obvious disappointment with the current state of affairs, argues that there is not much that political elites could do in the region with regards to reconciliation process. His opinions and views may seem defeatist, but as he explained earlier, the communities of Cazinska Krajina can only reach reconciliation through setting the record straight and distinguishing the truth from the lies. He believes that only first PM, Dr. Veladzic, had the actual institutional power and “an opportune moment in history to initiate and implement the change”. He pessimistically concludes that the elites have missed their chance.

CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

Previous academic researches on the nature and character of the armed conflict in Cazinska Krajina (1993-1995) have recognized its severity and complexity. However, scholars have not comprehensively addressed the question of how is this conflict viewed, shared and narrated among local social and political elites; why and to what extent memory of the recent tragic events burdens political and social communication, overall stability and prospects for consolidation/reconciliation.

The degree of regional political polarization generated in postwar period has grown in its importance, hence it is necessary to investigate means of bringing divided groups together and work on the reconciliation process. The uniqueness of this case rests in the apparent inability of local elites to reach political consolidation, especially given the wider unconsolidated Bosnian political arena, a country functioning under the international protectorate.

The primary aim of this study was to understand under what conditions political elites can use memory of the recent past in promoting or obstructing consolidation in the local society. The focus of this research was twofold. Initially, the central point was to understand the memory politics of the ruling elite in the aftermath of intra-Muslim war in Cazinska Krajina. Consequently, the study was set out to critically analyze the present-day state of memory, observed dominance of silence as well as the moral, legal and political confusion it creates in and among elite members.

Initially I argued that memory of the recent conflict in Cazinska Krajina matters to local political elites and it remains a salient factor of both division and decision making process. Subsequently, I argued that political elites are engaged in politics of long lasting silence on the dividing issues stemming from memory of the recent past. I attempted to show that, contrary to the politics and culture of silence, memory of the past events is present and highly relevant: legally, institutionally, and culturally. I tried to address these and related issues by exploring and explaining different attitudes of actors towards fundamental questions related to the recent past and its possible

implications.

Under the assumption that proactive engagement of ruling parties' elite members in dealing with issues stemming from the memory of the recent past might lead to political consolidation and more effective human rights protection, as well as to further reinforce reconciliation process within both socially divided communities, I discovered two basic insights that seemingly contradict each other.

First, memory of the conflict is institutionalized: legally, politically, and culturally. Second, the politics of memory and culture of memory are generally absent. What I found was a kind of prevalence of silence in politics which alters the attitudes of political elites towards each other and towards the past and its legacies.

The research also showed discrepancies, lack of political communication, lack of trust and willingness to engage in active process of reconciliation among elite members. Elite members mainly employ self-ascription of victimhood, while others are considered to be the wrongdoers, the ones who are misled or loyal to the wrong ideals and principles. Sense of betrayal is easily noticeable and it decreases the capacity of developing a normal communication. Even though, attitudes towards reaching a potential reconciliation are present, no attempt to seriously reflect on the past was observed. Reaching a compromise through dialog is questionable and depends on various intervening factors (political motivation, preferences communities, attitudes in the academia etc.)

Initially, I observed that members of the ruling political elite in the region are still under pressure of maintaining a strong stance in actions aimed at political and ideological opponents of the recent past, which could be explained by establishing constraints to their access to social rights and banning representatives of this group to be involved in political life in the regional institutions (1996-1998) under the argument of their previous treachery. In addition, it is impossible to ignore that members of political elites tend to prolong prioritization of established divisions over

means for political and social consolidation. With the aim of protecting new group unity, which includes the exclusion of the “traitors”, the ruling political elites are engaging in building up cultural distinctions based on silence rather than in proactively resolving issues emerging from the past events and building functioning relations among each other.

In addition, I have attempted to illustrate the features of ambivalent relationship of BH’s justice system towards ex-members of the two military forces in Krajina who are suspected of war crimes. In the empirical evaluation, I have highlighted the ambivalent legal norms which foster social isolation and inequality (for instance, access to basic socio-economic rights and rights of proper religious burial and public memorialization) which directly point to the attitudes of political elite members towards the legacies of the past.

I have also demonstrated how party interests influence attitudes of elite members with regard to remembering, interpreting and narrating the past events in Cazinska Krajina. In particular, ‘the fact of silence’ was observed in the region. However, elite members had different readings, applications and approaches towards this fact. The pluralism of interpretation showed that the memory of the recent past is alive and that it matters; the existence of silence did not indicate that the past is not relevant among elite members; in contrast, the silence has become a compact feature of the memory.

Gentlemen I have conducted interviews with informed me of several attempts to bridge divisions established by conflicts in Cazinska Krajina, none of which were successful. Memory of the tragic events is still deeply troubling ruling political elites, who are primary divided along the two lines according their roles in the war of Bosnian independence 92/95. They all fully appreciate the importance criminal trials taking place in Krajina right after the end of conflict, but they utter that the verdicts did not trigger further steps towards social and political consolidation.

In conclusion, this research has thrown up many questions in need of further investigation. The current study has only examined views and attitudes of ruling parties' elite members, mainly due to unresponsiveness of elite members coming from DNZ party and the community of Abdic's supporters, which might be too narrow for understanding the broader connotations of the memory and its functions in the region. Owing to this focus on the ruling political elites, significantly more work is needed to be done to determine the role of 'both political elites' in creating official narratives and history in the region, ways of reflecting on past as well as commemorating events.

If the debate is to be moved forward, a better understanding of identity building needs to be addressed. Considerably more work will need to be done in examining social/cultural memory building, as well as on the perspectives of self-identification, including new generations of people, within both communities of memory in Cazinska Krajina.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 – Map of Cazinska Krajina during the conflict in 1994



Western Bosnia in 1994:

- Territory controlled by the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
- Territory controlled by the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Territory controlled by the Republika Srpska
- Territory controlled by the Republic of Serbian Krajina
- Territory controlled by the government of Croatia
- Internationally recognized border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia
- De facto borders and front lines



MELKIC o KASIM	1972-1994	TABAKOVIC o SUAD	1963-1994
MILJKOVIC o HUSEIN	1953-1994	TABAKOVIC o ESAD	1959-1994
MILJKOVIC o EDIN	1973-1994	TABAKOVIC o REDZO	1968-1994
MUHELJIC o SEAD	1947-1994	TRALJESIC o SAFET	1971-1994
MUJAGIC o AHMET	1931-1994	VEHABOVIC o SENAD	1972-1994
MUJAGIC o IZET	1972-1994	VELADZIC o HASIB	1960-1994
MULALIC o MURAT	1974-1994	ZALIC o ZUHDIJA	1933-1994
MURATOVIC o DZEVAD	1969-1994	ABDJIC o SEAD	1972-1994
MURATOVIC o FIKRET	1970-1994	ALESEVIC o SEDIN	1969-1993
MURGIC o SULEJMAN	1971-1994	ALESEVIC o SAFET	1971-1993
MURGIC o MEJIM	1966-1994	ALIBASIC o MIRSAJ	1964-1993
MUSTEDANAGIC o SMAIL	1975-1994	ALIBEGIC o ARIF	1953-1993
NADAREVIC o ZUHDIJA	1962-1994	BAJREKTAREVIC o ARIF	1964-1993
NEZIREVIC o ISMET	1970-1994	BAJREKTAREVIC o HUSEIN	1971-1993
ODOBASIC o SEFIK	1959-1994	BALIC o ALAHVERDIJA	1972-1993
OKANVIC o SULEJMAN	1969-1994	BASIC o ZLATKO	1939-1993
OKIC o DERVIS	1963-1994	BASIC o SULEJMAN	1963-1993
OKIC o SEFIK	1958-1994	BEGANOVIC o AMIR	1969-1993
OMANOVIC o MUHAMED	1956-1994	BEGANOVIC o EKREM	1964-1993
OMERAGIC o AMIR	1970-1994	BEGULIC o SALIH	1953-1993
OMERAGIC o ISMET	1959-1994	BEHRIC o RASIM	1962-1994
OMERAGIC o ENVER	1958-1994	BEKANOVIC o ALE	1964-1993
OMERAGIC o SUAD	1970-1994	BRKIC o ABDULAH	1962-1998
PAJAZETOVIC o HASAN	1958-1994	BRKIC o FIKRET	1973-1998
PEHLIC o NIJAZ	1965-1994	CAUSEVIC o RIZVET	1976-1995
PEHLIC o IBRO	1936-1994	CUTURIC o SULEJMAN	1959-1996
PONJEVIC o BAJAZID	1961-1994	CATIC o ELVEDIN	1974-1995
REDZIC o ADNAN	1962-1994	CATIC o REFIK	1961-1995
RIZVIC o SEAD	-1994	CATIC o RIHAD	1974-1995
RIZVIC o MUSTAFA	1961-1994	CEJVANOVIC o EMIR	1968-1996
RIZVIC o SEAD	1974-1994	COSIC o ISMET	1972-1995
RIZVIC o HALIL	1958-1994	DAUTOVIC o MEHO	1959-1995
RIZVIC o SALIH	1972-1994	DELIC o ABDO	1972-1995
SALKIC o FIKRET	1960-1994	DIZDAREVIC o SMAIL	1972-1995
SALKIC o IZET	1958-1994	DIZDAREVIC o SEAD	1964-1995
SARAJLIJA o KASIM	1968-1994	DIZDAREVIC o IZET	1969-1996
SELIMAGIC o RESID	1965-1994	DOLIC o RIFET	1974-1998
SILAHIC o MIRSAJ	1969-1994	DURAKOVIC o RASIM	1969-1995
SMLATIC o HASIB	1948-1994	DURAKOVIC o OSMAN	1967-1995
SULJANOVIC o RAMIZ	1964-1994	DZAFEROVIC o SENAD	1974-1995
ŠAKANOVIC o JUSUF	1950-1994	DZAFIC o HUSEIN	1967-1995
ŠAKANOVIC o BAJRO	1955-1994	BOGIC o AMIR	1976-1995
ŠAKANOVIC o RESID	1955-1994	DULIC o HASIB	1964-1995
ŠAKANOVIC o MEHO	1955-1994		
SETKIC o ZIJAD	1958-1994		
HUSIC o JASMIN	1972-1992		

Appendix 3 - an overview of criminal proceedings against members of National Defense Forces of Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia by Cantonal Court of Una Sana in Bihac (April 10. 2012). Source: Cantonal Court in Bihac. The rulings were issued by Ms. Jelena Miljevic, Secretary of the Court.

	Number of Case	Name and Surname	Article in Criminal code of Former Yugoslavia	Court proceeding			
				Sentence		dismissed	freed
				1. instance	2. instance		
1	K-7/96-RZ	Dogic Senad	144 KZ SFRJ	2 years 6 months	6 months		
2	K-9/96-RZ	Torio Samir	144 KZ SFRJ			x	
3	K-7/97=RZ	Rizvic Zuhdija	142 /1 KZ SFRJ	12 years			
4	K-8/97-RZ	Zeric Ismet	142/1 KZ SFRJ	9 years	7 years		
5	K-9/97-RZ	Suvic Alaga	142 KZ SFRJ	2 years	1 year 6 months		
6	K-11/96-RZ	Abdic Fikret	142/1 KZ SFRJ			x	
7	K-2/02-RZ	Rizvic Zuhdija .	144 KZ SFRJ	7 years 4 months			
8	K-3/07-RZ	Huskic Sead	143 KZ SFRJ	10 years	8 years		
9	K-1/01-RZ	Jusic Zlatko	154/1 KZ SFRJ			x	
10	01 0 K 000554 09 K	Karajic Asko	144 KZ SFRJ	7 years			
11	K-1/98-RZ	Besirevic Alija	142/1 KZ SFRJ				x
12	01 0 K 005121 96 K	Odobasic Mustafa	144 KZ SFRJ			n/n	
13	01 0 K 005154 11 K	Dizdarevic Zuhdija	142 KZ SFRJ	10 years			
14	01 0 K 005510 11 K	Odobasic Mustafa	144 KZ SFRJ	7 years			
15	01 0 K 004547 10 K	Ahmetasevic Senad	144 KZ SFRJ	8 years			
		Unresolved cases	By 01.02.2012.				
1	01 0 K 000194 05 K	Almir Sabancevic	144 KZ SFRJ				
2	01 0 K 006240 12 K	Dautovic Sakib	142/1 KZ SFRJ				

Appendix 4 – The Fatwa issued by Islamic Association of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (November 1993) is registered under code 35/93. Source: Suljagic Emir, DANI, Dani br. 228, 19. Oktobar 2001.

S obzirom na novonastalu situaciju na području Bihaćkog muftijstva, koja je dovela do međusobnog prolijevanja muslimanske krvi, a u povodu različitih tumačenja oko tretmana poginulih pripadnika bošnjačkog naroda na pobunjeničkoj strani, Bihaćki muftija profesor Hasan ef. Makić je izdao sljedeću

FETVU

1. Svi oni za koje se posigurno zna da su svjesno i dobrovoljno uzeli oružje i krenuli protiv islama i bošnjačkog naroda su MURTEDI, tj. odmetnici od vjere islama i ummeta Muhammeda alejhiselam.

U prvom redu se misli na one koji imaju bilo kakvo rukovodeće mjesto u pobunjeničkoj vojsci ili organizaciji autonomaške vlasti. Takvima se, u slučaju pogibije, ne klanja dženaza niti se opremaju po islamskim propisima, jer se tretiraju kao nevjernici.

2. Za one koji su prisilno mobilizirani od strane Abdićeve vlasti, a u slučaju njihove pogibije, važe redovni islamski propisi opremanja i klanjanja dženaze.

3. Svi oni koji poginu na Allahovom putu u odbrani islama i domovine bošnjačkog naroda od pobunjeničke ruke imaju titulu šehida i kao takvima im pripadaju sve vjerske počasti.

Bihać, 23.11.1993. Hasan ef. Makić

--- THE END ---

Appendix 5 - List of interviewees

1. Mirsad Vojic, former Minister of Cantonal Ministry for Issues of Veterans and Disabled Veterans of the Defensive-Liberation War (SDA). 05. April 2012.
2. Izudin Saracevic, former high-ranking military officer in Fifth Corps. Currently, representative in City Council of Bihac (SDA). 08. April 2012.
3. Smail Klicic, M.A., former official in Cantonal Assembly and Municipality of Bihac (SDA). 13. April 2012.
4. Mujo Demirovic, Ph.D., professor of Sociology, Faculty of Law at the University of Bihac. Former University Rector and Federal Minister of Education and Science (2001-2003). (Formerly SDP). 14. April 2012.
5. Muhamed Skrgic, Ph.D., professor of pedagogy, Faculty of Education at the University of Bihac. Member of Cantonal Assembly in Bihac (third mandate). (DNZ). 16. April 2012.

*** the interview was not included in the analysis.**

6. Mirsad Veladzic, Ph.D., professor of food technology. Faculty of Biotechnology at the University of Bihac. The First Governor (PM) of the Una Sana Canton (SDA) 18. April 2012.
7. Semsudin Dedic, M.A., PM of the Una Sana Canton (2007-2011) (SDA). 20. April 2012.
8. Hamdija Lipovaca, Ph.D., current PM of the Una Sana Canton (SDP). 03. May 2012

Appendix 6 - Sample of Interview questions used in the research

Does memory matter in shaping attitudes of political elites in the Cazinska Krajina?

Does memory matter in shaping contemporary politics and societal culture?

How do party interests shape the politics of memory?

Is there instrumentalization of memory present in the Cazinska Krajina at the level of political elites?

What are the main forms of institutionalization of memory of the recent conflict?

Why and to what extent do they burden political and social communication, overall stability and prospects for consolidation/reconciliation?

Who decides on what is remembered and what is transferred at the level of political elites?

Was there some sort of strategy of common remembrance adopted in the Canton?

Silence Vs. proactive memory and remembrance? What about the 'official history'?

Is silence present in the society? Among elites? Who is enforcing the silence? In whose interest is it?

Is silence a constructive reflection on the past?

Was there an attempt to voice the silence by conscious actions of the actors, a proactive approach to what happened and how it matters?

Do you think that maintaining silence would be a defensible solution?

Can silence lead to reconciliation in Cazinska Krajina?

Were other options considered to resolve the issues?

What policies on commemorating events from the recent past are inherited in and among elite members?

What is your position on continuity of perceived mistrust?

How did the criminal trials help to bridge the void?

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